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the al-Qaeda leader, Osama Bin Laden |
Of course the U.S. attack in Pakistan that has resulted in the death of Osama bin Laden has sparked much debate in the U.S. and around the world. It is worth dwelling on the fact that the main object of these controversies, the veracity or otherwise of the death of the most famous face of the new millennium, is of little relevance to the political death of the Saudi Sheikh, permanently enshrined in the riots that have crossed and they are going through the Arab world, the first recipient of its actions since the early eighties of last century. Now the riots in Tunisia and Egypt succeeded, those crushed in Bahrain, Syria and Yemen, civil war (or bands war) in Libya has nothing to do with the order of the speech made by Al Qaeda (and other organizations of the Salafi universe) in recent years: the fight against American Satan and the Israeli Zionism claim to the caliphate project. Of all this there is no trace in the spring in winter in the Arab world. The marginalization of the speech of Al Qaeda is the direct consequence of the affirmation in the Arab world for making claims of a discourse on the themes of freedom, democracy and social justice deeply fell within the national framework of individual countries. The imagery of the medieval community of believers opposed to Jews and Crusaders was the big absent and the main defeated by the insurgency in Arab countries. This is nothing new; for many years, Al Qaeda could recruit its militants only between Muslims that had moved in the West, and then a fringe of the Islamic world. The political paradigm (and the religious one) was changed while in our mainstream media commentators orphans hate spewed by the various Western Fallaci continued to tell these countries as dangerous volcanoes fundamentalists kept at bay by the various Mubarak, Ben Ali, Kadhafi ... Returning to the event, which will probably ensure the re-election to the current President of the United States, we must analyze a few steps too obvious not to be seen. The first is the obvious coverage from Pakistan to the Sheikh. It is clear that at least the ISI (the powerful Pakistani intelligence has always been devoted to the double game between the U.S. and Al Qaeda), was perfectly aware of movement and residence of Osama. The second concerns the fact that the Pakistanis themselves have allowed the operation of the spectacular staged in Abbottabad. In practice they had searched the world number one in the house (and home, Abbottabad is a military center whose inhabitants are almost exclusively civilian relatives of soldiers themselves) and have allowed the Americans to close the account. In practice, they first protected it, for at least ten years, then handed him over to the U.S. It remains to ask why. The first possible answer has to do with the political death of the hypothesis of al-Qaeda, in other words, Osama was no longer needed, was a survivor of another age, uncomfortable enough to decide to allow the Americans to knock it out.
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the president of the United States,
Barack Obama |
Interesting scenarios
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Pakistani government militaries.
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But another political death has caused the physical death of Bin Laden: the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistanis are from time to fully pan-Islamic organization out of the influence of Saudi Sheikh, on the other hand it could still offer them, nor weapons, strategy or policy, or volunteer fighters. The death of bin Laden opens interesting scenarios in the Asian country. Osama was the last hurdle that made it impossible for an exit strategy for NATO governments in Kabul, and prevented serious negotiations between Karzai and the Taliban to reach a "fair" sharing of power. With the death of Sheikh Saudi Obama can proclaim his "mission accomplished" with more realism and more reasons than its predecessor, the European governments can begin to tentatively raise the question of withdrawal from a conflict whose popularity in Europe is bordering the zero, and Taliban freed from linkage with Al Qaeda, they can then present themselves as a national force respectable and ready to rule the country.
This is a scenario that may not translate into reality the foundation for short but not shameful exit from the Asian country has been taken by the USA with this move. On the other hand, the American military heroes in recent years are generally able to invent a way to abandon the occupation of a country in the least possible catastrophic and Obama himself was desperate to take off from the quicksand of a conflict without end discovers that the liberal left not upset the military too eager to boast a success before leaving. As is clear to Pakistan that the scenario described responds to the deepest desires of Islamabad. The position of Pakistan is clear: it wants a friendly government in Kabul to prevent any possibility of encirclement by India. The fact that India today may want to take on anything but Pakistan also has not moved an inch Pakistani paranoia. A friendly government in Islamabad wants to say an Islamic and Pashtun government. On the other hand are also Islamic and Pashtun military leaders and Pakistani intelligence.
The other ethnic groups in the country, first language make the cuts and the Hazaras, Shiite, but Mongolians are perceived as the long arm of Tehran, in turn, considered too close to India. In addition the reference to Islamic nationalism resize any Afghan who could find inspiration from old border issues between the two neighbors (the Durand Line of 1878 is not a border ethnic or historical) and push the arms of Kabul Delhi. Between 1979 and 1993, Islamabad has supported in this way the faction of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and from 1994 began to support the Taliban continue to do so during the war between NATO and the Afghan faction itself. Now the death of bin Laden is seen in Islamabad as the lamb to be sacrificed to achieve their goals allowing the U.S. to be able to ensure that it obtains its own. On the other hand, until 2001 the administration in Washington was their business with the government officials of the same movement. Why not do it now? Just remember no more pounding on the oppression of Afghan women campaign began ten years ago and soon throw in a drawer by the same governments that the time had to convince us that we were leaving for yet another good war.
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41 n. 364
Stefano Capello